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The Impact of Gender on Voluntary and Involuntary 
Executive Departure 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine the frequency and conditions of executive departure from S&P 1500 firms. 
Based upon published news reports, we find that female executives are more likely to 
depart their positions voluntarily and involuntarily in the presence of controls for firm 
performance, governance characteristics, and executive human capital. The results also 
suggest that women are less likely than men to depart voluntarily when firm size 
increases or board size decreases, while women are more likely than men to be dismissed 
when the board becomes more male-dominated.  
 
JEL Codes: G30, G32, G34, J44 
 
Keywords: executive turnover, gender differences, executive compensation, firm 
performance, corporate governance  
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1. Introduction 
The employment of women in U.S. corporations has increased dramatically since the 
early 1990s, particularly in the highest-ranking positions. Bertrand and Hallock (2001) document 
that between 1992 and 1997 women almost tripled their participation in the top corporate jobs. 
Along with the increase in female representation in executive labor markets, researchers and the 
media are paying increased attention to the effectiveness of female executives. Despite the recent 
advancements of women in corporate hierarchies, relatively little is known about whether female 
executives are more likely to be fired than men or whether females who depart their positions do 
so for different reasons than men, particularly in response to poor firm performance or 
differences in firm governance structure. This issue has received media attention in recent years. 
For example, an article in USA Today characterized 2005 rather bluntly as a "miserable year for 
female CEOs of Fortune 500 companies, in that female-headed companies trailed the Standard & 
Poor's 500 Index for the second straight year.1”   
The termination of powerful female executives is often a high-profile event, as in the 
cases of Carly Fiorina and Patricia Dunn, who were dismissed from Hewlett-Packard in 2005 
and 2006, respectively. Although a few well-publicized cases cannot serve as a valid basis for 
broad generalizations about the executive labor market, these recent anecdotes suggest that the 
issue of whether there are gender differences in the circumstances of executive departure 
warrants investigation. 
We track a sample of executive departures from S&P 1500 firms between 1996 and 2004. 
We classify executive departures as either voluntary or involuntary based on a careful 
examination of public news accounts accompanying the departures. We then examine whether 
the frequency and conditions of voluntary or involuntary departure differ for men and women.  
In general, we find systematic evidence that women executives are more likely to leave both 
                         
1 Jones, D. "Not-so-good year for female CEOs," USA Today.com, December 22, 2005 
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voluntarily and involuntarily from their positions in our sample of firms. Further analysis 
suggests that, although men and women are both more likely to depart involuntarily following 
poor corporate performance and when monitored by more effective boards, the relative impacts 
differ depending on gender. Specifically, women are less likely than men to depart voluntarily 
and in general when firm size increases or the size of the board decreases. Women are more 
likely than men to depart involuntarily when the board becomes more male-dominated. Thus, the 
evidence suggests that in spite of recent advancements by women into the executive ranks, their 
position at these ranks can be tenuous, particularly at smaller firms, firms with larger boards, and 
boards comprised of a higher fraction of male directors.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related 
literature on gender, executive turnover, and firm valuation measures. Section 3 describes the 
data and descriptive statistics. Section 4 explains the hypotheses and empirical methods that 
underlie our analysis, as well as the results of the analysis. Section 5 reports sensitivity tests that 
explore the robustness of our findings to alternative samples and classifications of departure 
reasons. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Related Literature  
2.1. Gender Diversity and Firm Valuation 
Several studies find a positive relation between the presence of females in the executive 
ranks and firm value. A 2005 article from the Economist reports that research in the U.S., U.K., 
and Scandinavia shows a strong correlation between the proportion of women in executive 
positions and shareholder returns.2 Catalyst, a research organization specializing in women’s 
career advancement, finds that firms with the highest representation of women on their top 
management teams outperform firms with the lowest representation of women. Adler (2001) 
studies a sample of Fortune 500 firms over a nineteen-year period and finds that firms with the 
                         
2 Economist, Helping women get to the top.  July 23rd 2005, 11. 
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best record of promoting women are more profitable than the median firms in their industries. 
Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003) find that gender diversity on the board of directors has a 
positive effect on Tobin’s Q. More generally, the literature on the relationship between board 
diversity and firm valuation measures is extensive (e.g., Zahra and Stanton (1988), Erhardt, 
Werbel, and Shrader (2003), Bonn, Yoshikawa, and Phan (2004), Farrell and Hersch (2005), and 
Adams and Ferreira (2007)). 
Not all studies find a positive association between gender diversity among executives and 
firm performance, however. Shrader, Blackburn, and Iles (1997) examine management data for 
the 200 largest U.S. firms in 1992 and find that higher percentages of women on the top 
management team and the board of directors have no effect on financial performance. Carleton, 
Nelson, and Weisbach (1998) find that firms targeted by TIAA-CREF for lack of gender and 
ethnic diversity on the board experience significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns 
surrounding the dates of board diversity targets. Lee and James (2007) find event-study evidence 
that announcements of female CEO appointments are viewed more negatively by the market than 
reactions to male CEO appointments. Even so, Wolfers (2006) does not find that markets 
systematically under-value firms led by females.  
Although the effects of racial and gender diversity on value remain unclear, several major 
U.S. firms have instituted diversity programs to help under-represented groups gain improved 
access to top management positions. The move toward increased diversity is not limited to the 
U.S. Another 2005 Economist article indicates that “in Britain, the number of female executive 
directors in FTSE 100 firms rose from 11 in 2000 to 17 in 2004.”3 In Norway, legislation was 
passed in 2003 requiring all companies to have 40 percent female representation of directors by 
January 1, 2008. The Scotsman reports that since 2003, the percentage of female board members 
in Norway has jumped from 6 percent to the current level of 37 percent. However, it is expected 
                         
3 Economist, The conundrum of the glass ceiling.  July 23rd 2005, 63. 
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that many firms will not meet the quota and may have to shut down until they are able to meet 
it.4 
 
2.2. Executive Turnover 
The impact of gender on executive turnover has received comparatively little research 
attention. Stroh, Brett, and Reilly (1996) document turnover rates of male and female managers 
employed by 20 Fortune 500 firms and find that females leave their organizations in higher 
proportions than males. In contrast, Lewis (1992) examines middle managers in the U.S. federal 
civil service and finds insignificant differences in turnover rates between men and women. 
Lyness and Judiesch (2001) examine voluntary turnover for over 26,000 managers in a financial 
services organization and find that the turnover rate among female managers is slightly lower 
than that of male managers. Elvira and Cohen (2001) study turnover differences between sexes at 
various organizational ranks and find that the proportion of executives in the firm who are 
female has no effect on the turnover of top-ranking women. However, we are aware of no 
evidence that exists on the relation between gender and involuntary dismissals.   
Empirical evidence generally suggests that poor corporate performance precedes CEO 
departure (Benston (1985); Coughlan and Schmidt (1985); Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988); 
Weisbach (1988); Puffer and Weintrop (1991); Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2004)) and the 
departure of lower-level executives (Mian (2001); McNeil, Niehaus, and Powers (2004)). 
Additional evidence suggests that the sensitivity of the relation between performance and 
turnover is affected by the relative performance of the firm within its industry (Morck, Shleifer, 
and Vishny, (1989)), the homogeneity of firms within the industry (Parrino (1997)) and the 
takeover intensity within the industry (Mikkelson and Partch (1997); Dennis and Kruse (2000)). 
Similarly, Weisbach (1988) and Denis and Denis (1995) find that board independence and 
                         
4 The Scotsman, Norway’s firms face gender law. December 28, 2007.  
http://news.scotsman.com/world?articleid=3624498  
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external monitoring affect turnover probabilities. Thus, turnover is associated with firm-level 
performance and governance characteristics, as well as industry characteristics. We therefore 
incorporate measures of market- and industry-adjusted financial and stock market performance 
as well as characteristics of the board to predict executive departure and the reasons for 
departure. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1. Sample Selection and Variable Construction 
 EXECUCOMP includes a listing of at least the top 5 executives in each firm in the S&P 
1500. We begin with the EXECUCOMP universe of firms between 1996 and 2004 and extract 
the 98,990 unique executive-firm-year observations during this period. In addition to name, 
position, and compensation, EXECUCOMP reports data on the gender, tenure, equity ownership, 
the presence of the executive on the board of directors, and, less frequently, the age of the 
executive. In fact, EXECUCOMP only reports the ages of about ten percent of the executives. 
We therefore augment data on ages with hand-collected information from proxy statements, 
annual reports, the Standard & Poor’s Directory of American Corporate Executives, and news 
stories. We are able to identify ages for an additional 36,557 executive-firm-year observations 
using these alternative sources as well as data from the IRRC database described below, resulting 
in age data for roughly fifty percent of the sample.  
EXECUCOMP lists a departure date for those executives who leave the firm. We use this 
field to indicate executive departures. Although EXECUCOMP also lists a reason for departure 
(RESIGNED, RETIRED, DECEASED, or UNKNOWN), these are not sufficient to classify the 
departure as voluntary or involuntary. We therefore follow the procedure outlined in Mian 
(2001), which uses public accounts of the departure from news stories to classify each departure 
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as “voluntary” or “involuntary”.5 Specifically, for each departing executive, we search Lexis-
Nexis for news stories related to the firm in general and the named executive in particular for up 
to twelve months surrounding the departure date.6 Based on the news and corporate events 
surrounding the departure announcement date, we classify departures as either voluntary or 
involuntary. Specifically, involuntary departures include firings that are specifically due to 
illegalities, fraud, or accounting manipulations; discipline for poor performance of the executive 
or firm; outright firings for which detailed specific reasons are not given; sudden departures 
where no reason was provided to suggest it was of the executive’s own accord; and terminations 
that are related to firm restructuring or mergers. Voluntary departures include resignations that 
fall into the following categories and where there is no evidence that the decision was forced: 
exits surrounding disagreements with management and/or the board (but that are clearly initiated 
by the executive); exits for voluntary professional reasons (i.e., accepting a new position or 
starting a new business); exits due to health, family or personal reasons; and retirements. We 
exclude observations in which the executive dies and those in which we can find no information 
regarding the conditions under which the executive departed.   
Annual board-level data come from the Investor Responsibility Resource Center (IRRC) 
database. We collect information on the size of the board, the proportion of independent and 
male directors, and, where missing from the EXECUCOMP database, the ages and equity 
ownership of executive-directors.  
Finally, firm stock and operating performance values, as well as industry values, are 
collected from the Compustat and CRSP databases. As described below, we require lagged 
values of certain performance measures to be available on the CRSP and Compustat databases.  
                         
5 Similar coding schemes are found in Balsam and Miharjo (2007), Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001), and Parrino 
(1997). The Appendix includes a detailed description of the coding scheme. 
6 The EXECUCOMP date is the actual departure date rather than the announcement date, although on occasion these 
are the same. In general, we are more interested in the announcement date and rely on news stories for this 
information. 
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This restriction in combination with data limitations from each of the databases reduces our final 
sample to 53,311 executive-firm-year observations, of which we have executive ages for 28,193. 
 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 1 we provide summary statistics on departure and the various reasons for 
departure. We report means for all executives, as well as separate means for men and women, 
departed executives, male executives who depart and female executives who depart. 
Approximately 3.9 percent of the executive-year observations in the sample are departures; 1.0 
percent of the observations are involuntarily departures and 2.9 percent are voluntary departures. 
The modal category of involuntary departures is that of sudden departure with no reason given, 
which accounts for 14.4 percent of all departures (see the “Departed Execs” column), and the 
modal category of voluntary departure is retirement, which accounts for 41.0 percent of 
departures. The summary results for males and females show that the proportion of female 
executive observations that consist of departures is significantly higher than the corresponding 
proportion for men. Women more frequently depart than men for both involuntary and voluntary 
reasons. Among only departing executives (see the last two columns of the table), women are 
more frequently fired for fraud or misdeeds, while men more often retire.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the characteristics of the executives and the 
firms in which they are employed. We report summary figures for the full sample, as well as 
separate statistics for departures, non-departures, involuntary departures, and voluntary 
departures. These variables include the firm’s total assets, return on assets, and stock returns. 
Here and throughout, dollar values are measured in constant 1994 dollars based on the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI).7 Return on assets, measured as the ratio of operating income to total assets, is 
adjusted by the median among other firms in the same Fama-French (1997) industry code. 
                         
7 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics web site: <http:data.bls.gov/PDQ/Servlet/SurveyOutputServlet>. 
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Monthly stock returns are predicted based on an OLS regression model that includes industry 
and market factors, and then a monthly abnormal return is formed by taking the difference 
between the actual and predicted returns of the firm where the executive is employed. A buy-
and-hold abnormal return is calculated over a one-year period preceding the beginning of the 
directory year listed for each executive in the sample.8  
The means indicate that, while 4.5 percent of the observations in the sample are on 
female executives, females consist of significantly higher proportions of both departing and 
involuntarily departing executives than males. There are also significant differences in the means 
of other variables among departing and non-departing executives, as well as among involuntarily 
and voluntarily departing executives. For instance, departing executives are older and more 
experienced than non-departing executives, and also work in firms with lower return on assets, 
lower cumulative abnormal returns, lower fractions of male directors, and higher fractions of 
independent directors. Comparing involuntarily versus voluntarily departing executives, we find 
that involuntarily departing executives are younger and less experienced, are higher paid, work 
in firms with lower return on assets and cumulative abnormal returns, and work in firms with 
smaller and less independent boards.  
[Insert Table 2 about here]  
 
4. Hypotheses and Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Hypotheses 
 
In this section, we develop a set of hypotheses concerning the probability that an 
executive departs in a given year, the probability that an executive departs involuntarily, and the 
probability that an executive departs voluntarily. The hypotheses rely on theories of the labor 
                         
8 For departing executives, we have also calculated abnormal returns based on the event announcement date rather 
than the fiscal year. The results for voluntary and involuntary departure are robust to this alternative specification of 
firm abnormal stock returns for departing executives. 
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market and agency conflicts. Specifically, involuntary departures reflect the actions of the firm, 
voluntary departures the actions of the executive, and general departures the actions of both. If 
firms make personnel decisions in order to maximize shareholder value, then we expect a firm to 
be more likely to dismiss an executive (i.e., involuntary departure) when the opportunity cost of 
doing so in terms of foregone shareholder value is low. If executives pursue employment 
opportunities that maximize their utility, given their skills, training and interests, then we expect 
an executive to be more likely to voluntarily depart a position when the opportunity cost of 
leaving the position is low. An executive will be more likely to depart generally (i.e., for either 
voluntary or involuntary reasons) if both of these conditions occur.  
We begin by developing specific hypotheses for involuntary departure. The effect of age 
is expected to be positive because older executives have a shorter time horizon to work for the 
firm and therefore the opportunity cost of dismissing them is low. The expected effect of 
experience is negative (controlling for age) because more experienced executives have greater 
firm-specific human capital, increasing their value to the firm. Higher-ranked executives may be 
more or less likely than lower-ranked executives to involuntarily depart, because higher rank 
may be an indicator of higher skill and higher ranked executives may be more difficult for the 
firm to replace, but at the same time these executives likely are held more accountable by firm 
owners. Similarly, directors may be more or less likely than non-directors to be dismissed. 
Compensation may also have a positive or negative effect, because it is positively correlated with 
innate ability, yet if compensation increases holding firm performance constant, then the firm is 
earning a lower return on its investment in the executive. The executive’s equity ownership in 
the firm should have a negative effect because it indicates incentives more closely aligned with 
the interests of firm owners, which should improve job performance. 
Firm size has an ambiguous expected effect on the likelihood of involuntary departure. 
Executives at larger firms, ceteris paribus, need more complex skill-sets and therefore may be 
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more difficult to replace (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008)). Alternatively, larger firms are more 
visible and poorly performing executives are more likely to be identified by the market and 
shareholders. Thus, we include firm size, but are agnostic as to the predicted effect. The financial 
and stock market performance measures should have negative effects, controlling for an 
executive’s compensation, because the firm is earning a higher return on its investment in the 
employee. Yermack (1996) argues that larger boards are less effective monitors due to high 
coordination costs, and we therefore predict a negative relation between board size and 
involuntary departure. Similarly, empirical evidence suggests that independent boards are more 
effective monitors (Weisbach (1988)), and therefore the fraction of independent directors should 
have a positive effect. However, since the fraction of the board that is male has no clear effect on 
the monitoring function, it should have no effect on involuntary departure.  
The effect of gender on involuntary departure is our central empirical question. Women 
will be more likely to depart involuntarily if firms have a preference for male executives, if 
women have lower levels of human capital than men, or if female executives have weaker labor 
force attachment than men. Although our data do contain several human capital controls, we are 
not able to definitively disentangle these alternative explanations. However, we seek to extend 
the literature by establishing formal evidence on whether or not a gender difference exists. 
 Our hypotheses concerning voluntary departure are as follows. The effect of age is 
uncertain because older executives have greater non-work opportunities such as the leisure 
available in retirement, but also may be less willing to depart because other firms are reluctant to 
hire them. The effect of experience is also uncertain because more experienced executives have 
higher levels of firm-specific human capital, making employment at other firms less attractive, 
but also have higher levels of general human capital that is transferable to other firms. The 
effects of being a higher-ranked executive or director, or a higher-paid executive, are also 
uncertain because these executives may have innately high skill that increases their labor market 
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value, yet may have difficulty finding comparably high positions at other firms. Compensation 
and share ownership in the firm have negative expected effects because they raise the 
opportunity cost of leaving a position.  
Firm size should have a positive effect on voluntary departure, because working in a 
large firm should expand the set of alternative employment opportunities available to the 
executive, due to the firm’s visibility. The financial and stock market performance of the firm 
should negatively affect voluntary departure, because a better performing firm is likely a more 
attractive place to work. Smaller and more independent boards may be more difficult to work for 
if they focus greater scrutiny on their executives or are more difficult for executives to influence 
than larger and less independent boards. Thus, we expect board size to have a negative effect and 
board independence to have a positive effect on voluntary departure. The fraction of the board 
that is male is expected to have no effect because it has no clear connection with the 
attractiveness of working for a given firm. 
It follows from the preceding remarks that for general departure, the expected effects of 
age, experience, executive rank, directorship, compensation, and firm size are all uncertain 
(because each has an uncertain effect on at least one type of departure). Share ownership in the 
firm has a negative expected effect on general departure because it has negative effects on both 
involuntary and voluntary departure. Following similar reasoning, financial and stock 
performance have negative expected effects, board size has a negative expected effect, and board 
independence has a positive expected effect. The fraction of the board that is male has no 
expected effect on either outcome; the reason for including this variable is to determine whether 
male-dominated boards treat men and women differently in models that allow for male- and 
female-specific slopes, as discussed below. Women are expected to be more likely to depart than 
men based on higher likelihoods of involuntary and voluntary departure.  
 
 
 13 
4.2 Empirical Model and Results for General, Involuntary, and Voluntary Departure 
In this section we test the above hypotheses concerning general, involuntary, and 
voluntary departure. We begin by using the full sample of executives to estimate the probability 
that a given executive departs his or her position in a given year without distinguishing the 
reasons for departure. The method that we utilize to estimate the probability of departure is 
random effects logit because there are observations available in multiple years for the majority of 
executives in our sample. Random effects is employed instead of fixed effects because the 
effects of time-invariant covariates are central to our analysis and because few executives in our 
sample are observed to depart in some years and not depart in other years, as would be required 
for identification with fixed effects.9 Thus, our model of departure is: 
 )()1Pr( Fit
F
itF
E
itEit TxxΛD µδββ +++== ,                                   [4.1] 
where Dit is a binary variable that equals 1 if executive i departs his or her position in year t and 
equals 0 otherwise; Λ is the cumulative logistic distribution function; xit
E is a vector of 
characteristics describing the executive in year t (some of these characteristics are time-
invariant); xit
F is a vector of characteristics describing characteristics of the firm where executive 
i is employed in year t; Tt is a vector of year dummies for each of the years in our sample 
excluding the final year; and µi
F is unobserved executive-firm heterogeneity. This term captures 
all unobserved factors that are constant for a given executive during all years spent with a given 
firm (e.g., attitudes of the executive toward work versus leisure, innate managerial ability, 
educational background, attitudes of the firm about when to fire executives, etc.). We specify 
executive-firm heterogeneity instead of just executive- or firm-specific heterogeneity in order to 
allow the unobserved component of departure to differ across firms for the same executive and 
                         
9 The random effects method imposes the stringent assumption that the executive-specific unobserved heterogeneity 
is uncorrelated with the observed covariates. However, our results are robust to a simple logit approach, which 
imposes the opposite extreme assumption of perfect correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity and the 
controls. 
    
 14 
across executives for the same firm10. However, note that anything that is constant across all 
executives in the same firm (such as the firm’s tastes for firing executives) will also be constant 
for a given executive during his or her time with the same firm, and consequently will be 
subsumed into µi
F. The random effects model is consistent and efficient under the assumption 
that µi
F is uncorrelated with xit
E and xit
F. 
The vector xit
E includes the gender and age of the executive as well as a quadratic in age 
to allow for a depreciating effect, the executive’s tenure with the firm, a dummy variable for 
whether or not the executive is a director of the firm, dummy variables for whether the executive 
is a CEO, CFO, or COO11, the natural log of the executive’s total annual compensation (which 
consists of base salary, bonuses, and fringe benefits), and the natural log of the dollar value of 
the firm’s shares owned by the executive. The vector xit
F includes the natural log of the firm’s 
one-year lagged total assets, the firm’s one-year lagged industry-adjusted return on assets (i.e., 
the industry-adjusted return on assets for year t-1), the firm’s one-year lagged buy-and-hold 
abnormal stock return adjusted for market and industry factors (i.e., the sum of the monthly 
abnormal returns for year t-1), the total number of directors on the firm’s board, the fraction of 
directors who are men, the fraction of directors who are independent, and a set of industry 
dummies based on Fama and French (1997) industry groupings12. We use lagged values of the 
firm size and performance measures (total assets, return on assets and abnormal returns) to avoid 
potential endogeneity between current-year values and executive departure or non-departure.  
These could be endogenous because whether or not the executive departs could affect 
                         
10 Alternatively, we also estimate the models using firm random effects and obtain qualitatively identical results. 
11 CEO refers to “Chief Executive Officer,” CFO to “Chief Financial Officer,” and COO to “Chief Operating 
Officer.” The excluded category of executives, with reference to these title variables, consists of those holding titles 
that are vice-presidential in nature. This category includes the majority of executives in the EXECUCOMP sample. 
12 Specifically, we aggregated the 48 Fama and French (1997) industry categories into the following broader groups: 
food and agriculture; entertainment and leisure; consumer and retail goods; health care services; textiles, 
construction, and manufacturing; drugs and chemicals; mining and energy; utilities and telecommunications; 
electricity; and finance, insurance and real estate. The excluded category in the regression is food and agriculture. 
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contemporaneous measures of performance. However, the same problem should not pertain to 
prior-year performance.   
We also estimate random effects logit models of the probability of involuntary and 
voluntary departure with the same set of controls as the general departure model: 
 )()1Pr( Fit
F
itF
E
itEit TxxΛI µδββ +++==                                    [4.2] 
 )()1Pr( Fit
F
itF
E
itEit TxxΛV µδββ +++== ,                                 [4.3] 
where Iit and Vit are dummy variables that equal 1 if the executive departs involuntarily or 
voluntarily, respectively, in year t. All other controls are defined as in [4.1]. 
The estimates of two specifications of each model [4.1]-[4.3] are reported in Table 3. For 
each departure category, one of the models (Model 1) excludes age, age squared, and tenure, 
while the other model (Model 2) includes these variables. Because age and tenure are 
unavailable for some of the executives, the regressions for Model 2 have smaller sample sizes 
than those for Model 1.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The results for general departure suggest that, holding constant executive and firm 
characteristics, women are 3.4 to 6.8 percentage points more likely to depart than men, 1.3 to 1.5 
percentage points more likely to involuntarily depart, and 1.5 to 3.8 percentage points more 
likely to voluntarily depart. While the general and voluntary departure results are consistent with 
women placing a higher value on opportunities outside the firm, the involuntary departure result 
is consistent with corporations having a greater preference for male executives (i.e., a 
discrimination hypothesis). However, it is also consistent with gender differences in unobserved 
ability, and with lower labor force attachment on the part of women executives.    
  Age increases the likelihood of general, involuntary, and voluntary departure, but at a 
diminishing rate in each case since the marginal effect of the quadratic term is negative and 
significant. However, note that the rate of depreciation is very small because the marginal effect 
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of the quadratic term is much smaller in magnitude than that of the linear term. These results are 
consistent with older executives having a higher opportunity cost of remaining with the firm and 
with firms having a higher opportunity cost of retaining older executives. Tenure with the same 
firm reduces the likelihood of general departure and involuntary departure, but does not affect 
the likelihood of voluntary departure. These results are consistent with more experienced 
executives having higher levels of firm-specific human capital, which makes them more valuable 
to their firms.  
 The effects of the variables indicating the executive’s position in the firm are sensitive to 
whether or not age and tenure controls are included, likely because age and experience are 
correlated with title. However, we find that CEOs are less likely to depart in general and to 
depart voluntarily than executives with titles in the excluded category (primarily vice-presidents) 
but CEOs are no more or less likely to involuntarily depart. COOs are more likely to 
involuntarily depart than lower-ranked executives, but just as likely to depart in general and to 
voluntarily depart (controlling for age, tenure, and directorship). CFOs do not display 
consistently different likelihoods of any type of departure relative to lower-ranked executives. 
These results are consistent with CEOs having a higher opportunity cost of leaving the firm than 
lower-ranked executives and with COOs bearing greater accountability for the performance of 
the firm. Directors are more likely than non-directors to depart in general, to depart involuntarily, 
and to depart voluntarily when age and tenure are excluded, but this difference vanishes in the 
presence of age and tenure controls. This reflects that directors tend to be older and more 
experienced than non-directors. 
Executives with higher total compensation are less likely to depart in general and less 
likely to depart voluntarily than those with lower total compensation, but are no more or less 
likely to involuntarily depart. Specifically, a ten percent increase in total compensation is 
predicted to decrease the likelihood of general departure by 2.4 to 3.4 percentage points and that 
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of voluntary departure by 2.7 to 3.2 percentage points. These results are consistent with higher 
paid executives having a greater opportunity cost of leaving their positions. The lack of an effect 
for involuntary departure suggests that compensation may serve as a proxy for innate executive 
ability, offsetting the fact that the firm earns a lower return on its investment in the executive 
when compensation increases, holding firm performance constant. Consistent with our 
hypotheses, the effect of executive share ownership is negative on all three categories of 
departure13. A ten-percent increase in the value of shares owned lowers the probability of each 
type of departure by about 0.1 percentage points. Although the magnitude of the effect is small, 
it is consistent with firm ownership aligning managers’ interests more closely with those of 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). 
The total assets of the firm have positive effects on all three categories of departure. A 
ten percent increase in the level of total assets is predicted to increase the likelihood of general 
departure by 4.6 to 5.1 percentage points, the likelihood of involuntary departure by 0.8 to 1.1 
percentage points, and that of voluntary departure by 2.9 to 4.1 percentage points. These results 
suggest that executives are more mobile or under greater scrutiny from the market when working 
in larger firms. Higher industry-adjusted return on assets and market- and industry-adjusted 
abnormal stock returns reduce the probability of all types of departure, consistent with the 
findings of Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004). Our findings therefore support the notion that 
executives are more attractive to firms, and vice-versa, when firm performance is strong.  
Executives employed by firms with larger boards are less likely than those with smaller 
boards to depart in general and to involuntarily depart, but are no more or less likely to 
voluntarily depart. An additional board member reduces the probability of general departure by 
about 1.0 percentage points and that of involuntary departure by about 0.5 percentage points. 
                         
13 We also estimated the models using the executive’s proportional share ownership, rather than the dollar value of 
share ownership, and continued to find negative effects on all types of departure. 
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These results are consistent with the literature that finds smaller boards are more effective 
monitors (Yermack (1996)), which may enhance their ability to detect performance lapses that 
are grounds for executive terminations. The fraction of the board that is male has no effect on 
any type of departure, indicating that this variable is not directly connected to an executive’s 
valuation of a job in a particular firm, or the firm’s valuation of a particular executive. In 
contrast, the fraction of the board that is independent has positive effects on all types of 
departure, consistent with more independent boards being better monitors as well as less 
appealing to work with than less independent boards.  
 
4.3 Results with Gender Interactions  
 Table 4 reports coefficient estimates from random effects logit models of general, 
involuntary, and voluntary departure that include a full set of interactions between the female 
dummy and all of the control variables listed in equations [4.1]-[4.3]. This approach allows us to 
test for the possibility that the effects of the control variables differ for men and women. We 
report coefficients instead of marginal effects because it is problematic to assign a meaningful 
interpretation to the marginal effects of interaction terms in a non-linear model14. Thus, the 
results that we presently report will speak primarily to the directions (rather than the magnitudes) 
of the effects of the control variables on the departure probabilities for men and women. 
 The table is organized as follows. For each departure outcome, we estimate two models, 
one without the age and tenure controls (Model 1), and the other with these controls (Model 2). 
For each departure category, we report the coefficients for men, which are the coefficients on the 
un-interacted forms of the variables (first column for each model), and the coefficients for 
                         
14 The reason is that, in a non-linear model, the marginal effect of a variable incorporates both the coefficient and a 
probability weight. When a control variable is interacted with a dichotomous variable, the probability weights on the 
marginal effects of the interacted and un-interacted variables are different. This implies that the marginal effect of 
the interaction term does not measure the difference in the marginal effects for the two groups, as it would in a linear 
model. However, the coefficient on the interaction term still indicates the direction of the difference in the effect for 
the two groups. 
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women (second column for each model), which are computed as the sums of the coefficients on 
the interacted and un-interacted forms of the variables. The significance of the coefficients for 
men are evaluated with simple t-tests, while the significance of the coefficients for women are 
evaluated with Chi-Square tests, since they are sums of coefficients. Therefore, the “star” 
superscripts in the table indicate coefficients that are significantly different from zero, according 
to the t-tests or Chi-Square tests referenced above.   
The results for men in Table 4 are similar to those for the pooled effects for women and 
men when the effects are constrained to be the same across gender (i.e., Table 3). In particular, 
the effects of all variables except the characteristics of the board are the same in sign and 
significance for men as they are for men and women combined. This is unsurprising since the 
majority of the sample is male. However, there are some differences in the effects of the board 
characteristics for male executives relative to the pooled effects for men and women. The size of 
the board has a negative effect on voluntary departure instead of an insignificant effect (when 
age and tenure controls are included), which suggests that an increase in the size of the board 
lowers the likelihood of all types of departure for men. The fraction of male directors has a 
negative effect on the likelihood of general and voluntary departure for men, as opposed to 
insignificant effects when constrained to be the same for men and women. This suggests that 
men prefer to remain employed at firms with more male-dominated boards.  
 The results for women in Table 4 indicate that several of the controls have different 
effects on the various types of departure for women than they do for men. Considering first the 
models for general and voluntary departure (with age and tenure included), being a director has a 
negative effect for women as opposed to an insignificant effect for men, while being a CEO has 
an insignificant effect for women rather than a negative effect for men. Being a CFO has an 
insignificant effect on general departure for women rather than a negative effect for men, but 
being a CFO has no effect on voluntary departure for either women or men. Compensation and 
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the value of shares owned by the executive have insignificant effects for women as opposed to 
negative effects for men (in the models without age and tenure; when these are included 
compensation has a positive effect on general and voluntary departure for women). Thus, the 
results are supportive of the notion that increases in compensation or share ownership increase 
the opportunity cost of leaving a position more for men than for women. Total assets have an 
insignificant effect on general departure for women (with or without the age and tenure 
variables) instead of a positive effect for men, whereas total assets have a negative effect on 
voluntary departure for women compared to a positive effect for men. This indicates women are 
less likely than men to want to leave their positions when firm size increases, consistent with 
larger firms being more “female-friendly” than smaller firms. Larger firms may have more 
generous family leave programs, offer on-site childcare, or offer more flexible scheduling. 
Return on assets has an insignificant effect on all departure categories for women (with age and 
tenure included) in contrast to negative effects for men, suggesting that increases in the 
performance of the firm improve the working environment more for men than for women. It may 
be that, in evaluating the quality of the work environment, women place a relatively greater 
value on items other than firm performance (such as how the firm treats female employees).  
 The size of the board also has different effects on general and voluntary departure for 
men and women. Essentially, the effect of an increase in board size on both outcomes is more 
positive for women than for men, indicating that women are more likely than men to want to 
leave their positions when the size of the board increases (holding overall firm size constant).  
This result is consistent with men having a greater preference than women for working with 
larger boards. Perhaps women find it more difficult to gain influence or respect when dealing 
with larger boards. The fraction of men on the board also has different effects on general 
departure for women and men. Essentially, the effects are more positive for women (either 
positive or insignificant compared to the negative effect for men), indicating that women are 
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more likely than men to want to leave their positions when the fraction of male board members 
increases. This suggests that men have a greater preference than women for working with more 
male-dominated boards. The fraction of independent directors has an insignificant effect on both 
general and voluntary departure for women in contrast to positive effects on both types of 
departure for men, suggesting that women have a greater preference for working with more 
independent boards than do men. A possible explanation is that more independent boards are less 
intertwined with old boy networks than are boards consisting of a higher fraction of insiders.  
 We also observe in Table 4 that the effects of most of the variables on involuntary 
departure are insignificant for women despite being significant for men. The only variable that 
has a significant impact on the probability of involuntary departure for women is the abnormal 
stock return, which has a negative effect. Thus, the results suggest that for women, involuntary 
departure probabilities are less sensitive to differences in firm characteristics than they are for 
men. However, the relatively small sample size for women compared to men may be partially 
responsible for the lack of significance on some of the coefficient estimates.  
 In Table 5 we report the p-values for the tests of whether the coefficients for men and 
women are significantly different from each other, which are the t-tests on the interaction terms 
estimated in the regression. These p-values indicate that the effects of several variables on 
general and voluntary departure are significantly different for women and men. Specifically, the 
effects of directorship, compensation, total assets, abnormal returns, the size of the board, and 
the fraction of male directors differ significantly for the two groups. The effect of board 
independence differs significantly between the two groups only for voluntary departure, and only 
when age and tenure are included in the model. 
 For involuntary departure, however, the tests on the interaction terms generally fail to 
detect significant differences between the male and female coefficients. In the case of abnormal 
stock returns, the lone variable that is individually significant for women, the effects for women 
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and men are both negative and statistically indistinguishable at the ten percent level. Inspection 
of the p-values also reveals that the only variable with a significantly different effect for women 
and men is the fraction of male board members. The sign of the coefficient is negative for men 
and positive for women, which suggests that women are more likely than men to be dismissed 
when the fraction of male board members increases. This is consistent with more male-
dominated boards having a preference for retaining male rather than female executives.  
However, this statement must be made with caution, as the coefficients for men and women are 
both insignificantly different from zero when tested separately. 
 
5. Sensitivity Tests 
We perform a variety of sensitivity tests on our models due to the subjective nature of the 
classification scheme used to distinguish voluntary from involuntary departures. Although in the 
interests of brevity we do not report these results in separate tables, we briefly discuss them here. 
Our first sensitivity test is to conduct the analysis in Tables 3 and 4 with retirements excluded. 
The reasons for excluding retirements are that these departures are considered voluntary (in the 
absence of evidence of pressure from the firm) and men are much more likely to retire than 
women. Thus, excluding retirements could potentially change the inference of gender differences 
in the circumstances of departure. However, most of the results are unchanged by the exclusion 
of retirements, which may be because we have included age controls and conducted intensive 
scrutiny of news accounts related to retirements to ensure that they were appropriately classified.  
Most notably, women remain more likely to depart in general, to involuntarily depart, and to 
voluntarily depart when retirements are excluded. However, the results for compensation are 
affected by the exclusion of retiring executives, in that the effect of compensation on general 
departure becomes insignificant rather than negative when age and tenure are excluded. This 
may be because the exclusion of executives who retire results in a younger pool of executives, 
and younger executives become more mobile than older executives as compensation increases.  
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The results for the fraction of male directors in the models with gender interactions are also 
different when we exclude retirements, in that the effect of the fraction of male directors on 
general departure is no longer negative for men. This suggests that old boy networks in firms 
with male-dominated boards are more beneficial for older executives, who are a lower 
percentage of the sample when retirements are excluded.  
 In specifications that are also unreported, we adopt an alternative classification scheme 
that moves merger-related departures into the voluntary category. While adopting this new 
scheme, we bring retirements back into the sample and continue to consider them as voluntary 
departures. This change has little effect on the results for involuntary or voluntary departure. 
Again, women are more likely to depart both voluntarily and involuntarily. The major 
substantive change is that for women, the fraction of male directors now has a positive effect on 
involuntary departure. This strengthens some of our prior inferences that women are more likely 
than men to be dismissed as the board becomes more male-dominated. 
 In a final set of unreported sensitivity tests, we adopt a classification scheme that moves 
all departures except firing for fraud and poor performance into the voluntary category. Thus, we 
now consider as involuntary only those departures that are for the most clearly disciplinary 
reasons. This change in the classification scheme produces some interesting changes. We now 
find that age has no effect on involuntary departure, suggesting that the bulk of dismissals of 
older executives are for non-disciplinary reasons. We also now find that being a director has a 
consistently positive effect on involuntary departure, suggesting that the dismissals of directors 
tend to be for clearly disciplinary reasons. The effects of return on assets and board 
independence are now insignificant, indicating that increases in firm operating performance do 
not help prevent the most clearly disciplinary departures, while the additional firings undertaken 
by more independent boards tend to be for reasons other than outright fraud or demonstrably 
poor performance. The effect of return on assets on general departure also becomes significantly 
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more negative for women than men, indicating that better operating performance is relatively 
more helpful to women in reducing the chances of the most clearly disciplinary dismissals. 
Despite the aforementioned changes, our key results regarding the gender difference in the 
probabilities of voluntary and involuntary departure are robust to this reclassification. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Through anti-discrimination policies, changing cultural attitudes, and evolving labor 
force participation trends, women are becoming better represented in executive labor markets 
over time. Nevertheless, recent widely publicized events have raised the concern that 
corporations are relatively quick to dismiss female executives. Because this sentiment seems to 
arise from intense media scrutiny of a few cases, we closely investigate the reasons for departure 
in a sample of male and female executives from the EXECUCOMP database. Specifically, 
during the period 1996-2004, we classify departures into categories of voluntary and involuntary 
departure and examine the determinants of these departure types, as well as of general departure.  
Our key findings are that women are more likely to depart, to involuntarily depart, and to 
voluntarily depart than men, controlling for firm performance, governance characteristics, and 
executive human capital. These results are robust to specifications that include age and tenure 
controls, that exclude retirements, and that use different classification schemes for involuntary 
and voluntary departures. Thus, our evidence is supportive of a discrimination hypothesis, but 
cannot definitively rule out alternative explanations such as gender differences in unobserved 
human capital or labor force attachment. Moreover, because we find women are also more likely 
to voluntarily depart, the evidence also supports the notion that women have higher returns than 
men in non-labor market activities. 
Our remaining findings are supportive of labor market and agency theories. Generally, 
the probability of involuntary departure is high when the opportunity cost to the firm of 
dismissing an executive is low, the probability of voluntary departure is high when the 
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opportunity cost to the executive of leaving a position is low, and the probability of general 
departure is high in circumstances conducive to both voluntary and involuntary departure.  
We also estimate models with gender interaction terms to test whether the effects of the 
controls on the various types of departure are different for women and men. We find differences 
in the determinants of general and voluntary departure that suggest a greater preference on the 
part of women relative to men for working in larger firms, firms with smaller boards, and firms 
with less male-dominated boards. Furthermore, the involuntary departure results provide 
suggestive evidence that more male-dominated boards are more likely to dismiss women than 
men.  
While we have attempted to provide rigorous evidence on the existence of gender 
differences in the reasons for departure, we acknowledge that there are some limitations to our 
analysis. Any classification scheme that codes departures into voluntary and involuntary 
categories is inherently subjective, so that it is difficult to state with absolute certainty whether 
the departure of an executive is voluntary or involuntary. In addition, age controls are available 
for only a portion of the sample, so a verdict on the robustness of our full-sample results must 
await the availability of a more complete data source on executive ages. However, the similarity 
of the results with and without the age controls offers some reassurance on this front. Finally, 
one could always desire more detailed controls for the professional and cognitive ability of the 
executive, as well as educational background. The title, director, and compensation variables that 
we use here are indirect controls for qualifications and skills. Likewise, more direct controls for 
the outside opportunities available to the executive would allow us in some cases to draw more 
precise conclusions about the motivating factors behind a departure. Therefore, further work is 
required to definitively disentangle whether our results reflect discrimination or simply the 
efficient functioning of the corporate labor market in light of fundamental differences between 
women and men. 
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Appendix 
Reasons for Executive Departures from Lexis-Nexis News Reports 
Classifications based on Mian (2001) 
 
Involuntary Departures 
 
A.) Firings or resignations for fraud associated with accounting irregularities or illegalities 
where the executive is clearly blamed 
 
B.) Clear firing because of poor company performance or questions of competence (but no 
illegal actions on the part of the executive) 
 
C.) Clear firing but no reason directly provided or suggested 
 
D.) Left suddenly with no reason provided 
 
E.) Merger, reorganization, or corporate restructuring-related. 
 
Voluntary Departures 
 
F.) Quit due to disagreements with management/board of directors (departure initiated by 
executive) 
 
G.) Left with cause/voluntary professional reasons 
 
H.) Specific personal reasons, such as health or family reasons 
 
I.) Retirement 
 
Other Classifications (excluded from empirical analysis) 
 
J.) Could not find. This category represents searches on the executive’s name and firm in 
which no results were found. 
 
K.) Death. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Executive Departure and Departure Reasons 
Variables 
All Execs 
Male 
Execs 
Female 
Execs 
Departed 
Execs 
Male 
Departed 
Female 
Departed 
DEPARTED 0.0392 0.0376*** 0.0719*** 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 (0.1940) (0.1903) (0.2583) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
INVOLUNTARILY DEPARTED 0.0102 0.0093*** 0.0290*** 0.2605 0.2478*** 0.4035*** 
 (0.1005) (0.0961) (0.1679) (0.4390) (0.4318) (0.4920) 
Fired for fraud or misdeeds 0.0006 0.0005*** 0.0034*** 0.0148 0.0120*** 0.0468*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0212) (0.0579) (0.1210) (0.1089) (0.2118) 
Fired for poor performance 0.0022 0.0020*** 0.0063*** 0.0560 0.0532* 0.0877* 
 (0.0468) (0.0447) (0.0792) (0.2300) (0.2245) (0.2837) 
Fired for unspecified reasons 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0024 0.0026 0.0000 
 (0.0097) (0.0099) (0.0000) (0.0489) (0.0510) (0.0000) 
Left suddenly (no reason provided) 0.0056 0.0052*** 0.0151*** 0.1437 0.1377*** 0.2105*** 
 (0.0748) (0.0718) (0.1221) (0.3508) (0.3447) (0.4089) 
Left for merger-related reasons 0.0017 0.0016*** 0.0042*** 0.0436 0.0423 0.0585 
 (0.0413) (0.0398) (0.0647) (0.2042) (0.2012) (0.2353) 
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES 0.0290 0.0283*** 0.0429*** 0.7395 0.7522*** 0.5965*** 
 (0.1677) (0.1659) (0.2026) (0.4390) (0.4318) (0.4920) 
Quit due to disagreements w/ board 0.0007 0.0006*** 0.0021*** 0.0172 0.0162 0.0292 
 (0.0260) (0.0247) (0.0458) (0.1302) (0.1262) (0.1690) 
Left for professional reasons 0.0111 0.0104*** 0.0265*** 0.2835 0.2760** 0.3684** 
 (0.1048) (0.1014) (0.1606) (0.4508) (0.4471) (0.4838) 
Left for personal reasons 0.0011 0.0009*** 0.0050*** 0.0283 0.0245*** 0.0702*** 
 (0.0332) (0.0304) (0.0709) (0.1657) (0.1547) (0.2562) 
Retired  0.0161 0.0164*** 0.0092*** 0.4104 0.4356*** 0.1287*** 
 (0.1258) (0.1270) (0.0957) (0.4920) (0.4960) (0.3358) 
Number of exec-year observations 53311 50932 2379 2088 1917 171 
Number of unique executives 17644 16667 977 2061 1896 165 
(Standard deviations in parentheses) 
***Difference between male and female categories is significant at 1%; ** 5%; *10% 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Firm and Executive Variables 
Variables 
Full 
Sample Departed 
Non 
Departed 
Involuntarily 
Departed 
Voluntarily 
Departed 
Female 0.0446 0.0819*** 0.0431*** 0.1268*** 0.0661*** 
 (0.2065) (0.2743) (0.2031) (0.3331) (0.2485) 
Age (years) 53.1877 54.9790*** 53.0888*** 51.1968*** 56.2500*** 
 (8.0043) (7.9660) (7.9949) (6.6113) (7.9819) 
Tenure with firm (years) 7.5829 8.0761** 7.5628** 4.0345*** 9.5001*** 
 (11.6895) (13.0068) (11.6323) (9.1266) (13.8463) 
Director 0.3682 0.4023*** 0.3668*** 0.3750 0.4119 
 (0.4823) (0.4905) (0.4819) (0.4846) (0.4923) 
Chief Executive Officer 0.1940 0.1346*** 0.1964*** 0.1673*** 0.1231*** 
 (0.3954) (0.3414) (0.3973) (0.3736) (0.3286) 
Chief Financial Officer 0.1353 0.1489* 0.1347* 0.1599 0.1451 
 (0.3420) (0.3561) (0.3414) (0.3669) (0.3523) 
Chief Operating Officer 0.0821 0.1145*** 0.0808*** 0.1618*** 0.0978*** 
 (0.2745) (0.3184) (0.2725) (0.3686) (0.2971) 
Total Direct Comp. ($ million) 1.5023 1.5779 1.4992 1.9805*** 1.4360*** 
 (4.4836) (3.6882) (4.5131) (5.1996) (2.9678) 
Exec equity ownership ($ million) 20.1221 5.9407 20.7002 2.9250* 7.0033* 
 (443.0559) (49.1781) (451.8775) (14.6483) (56.4915) 
Total Assets ($ billion) 6.2449 8.2608*** 6.1627*** 10.2818 7.5488 
 (26.5105) (33.7033) (26.1726) (46.8144) (27.6260) 
Industry-adjusted return on assets (%) 0.0673 0.0550*** 0.0678*** 0.0453** 0.0584** 
 (0.1225) (0.1203) (0.1226) (0.1166) (0.1214) 
1-year buy-hold abnormal returns (%) -0.0062 -0.0829*** -0.0031*** -0.1518*** -0.0586*** 
 (0.4530) (0.4764) (0.4517) (0.5511) (0.4447) 
Total number of directors 9.7241 9.7553 9.7228 9.2279*** 9.9411*** 
 (3.0520) (2.9922) (3.0544) (2.9042) (3.0016) 
Fraction of male directors 0.9226 0.9156*** 0.9229*** 0.9170 0.9151 
 (0.0853) (0.0865) (0.0853) (0.0904) (0.0851) 
Fraction of independent directors 0.6339 0.6572*** 0.6329*** 0.6408*** 0.6630*** 
 (0.1819) (0.1706) (0.1823) (0.1776) (0.1677) 
Number of executive-years 53311 2088 51223 544 1544 
Number of unique executives 17644 2061 17176 541 1529 
Standard Deviations in Parentheses.  
***Difference between departed and non-departed or between involuntarily and voluntarily departed categories is significant at 1%; ** 5%; *10% 
The excluded group of executive titles is vice-president 
Total direct compensation includes base salary, bonuses, and fringe benefits 
Total assets and return on assets are lagged one year prior to the year of observation listed for the executive 
Return on assets is measured as the deviation from the industry median, where industry groupings are as defined by Fama and French (1997) 
1 year buy-and-hold abnormal returns are the deviations of actual monthly stock returns from the predictions of a market and industry model, summed 
over the year prior to that listed for the executive 
Executive equity ownership is calculated by multiplying the number of shares owned by the firm’s stock price per share at the end o f the year prior to 
that listed for the executive 
The number of executive-year observations on age in each of the columns is 28210, 1475, 26735, 371, and 1104 
The number of executive-year observations on tenure in each of the columns is 53292, 2088, 51204, 544, and 1544 
The number of unique executives in the departed and non-departed columns sum to a number greater than the number of unique executives in the full 
sample because nearly every executive who is observed as a departure is also observed as a non-departure in some other year 
The number of unique executives in the involuntarily and voluntarily departed columns sum to a number greater than the number of unique executives 
in the departed column because some executives are observed as both voluntary departures and involuntary departures (in different years) 
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Table 3 Random Effects Logit Models of the Reason for Departure (Marginal Effect Estimates) 
GENERAL 
DEPARTURE 
INVOLUNTARY 
DEPARTURE 
VOLUNTARY 
DEPARTURE Independent Variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) 
Female 0.0337*** 0.0678*** 0.0129*** 0.0152*** 0.0153*** 0.0382*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age X 0.0052*** X 0.0017*** X 0.0051*** 
  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.000) 
Age Squared X -0.0000*** X -0.0000*** X -0.0000*** 
  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002) 
Tenure with firm X -0.0002*** X -0.0002*** X -0.0000 
  (0.008)  (0.000)  (0.995) 
Director 0.0261*** -0.0029 0.0018** -0.0003 0.0238*** -0.0024 
 (0.000) (0.244) (0.024) (0.745) (0.000) (0.247) 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) -0.0212*** -0.0295*** -0.0002 -0.0015 -0.0192*** -0.0246*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.852) (0.110) (0.000) (0.000) 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 0.0035 -0.0062** 0.0019** -0.0014 0.0010 -0.0035 
 (0.123) (0.019) (0.045) (0.106) (0.601) (0.107) 
Chief Operating Officer (COO) 0.0053* 0.0009 0.0065*** 0.0027** -0.0023 -0.0028 
 (0.056) (0.778) (0.000) (0.043) (0.272) (0.250) 
Log Total Direct Comp. (millions) -0.0024*** -0.0034*** 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0027*** -0.0032*** 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.589) (0.845) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log Exec equity ownership (millions) -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0000* -0.0001*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.0000) (0.000) (0.060) (0.007) 
Log Total Assets (billions) 0.0051*** 0.0046*** 0.0008*** 0.0011*** 0.0041*** 0.0029*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry-adjusted return on assets -0.0328*** -0.0341*** -0.0075*** -0.0070*** -0.0183*** -0.0170** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.015) 
1-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns -0.0134*** -0.0154*** -0.0044*** -0.0049*** -0.0067*** -0.0068*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Total number of directors -0.0010*** -0.0011** -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0003 -0.0004 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.000) (0.008) (0.335) (0.203) 
Fraction of male directors -0.0108 -0.0208 -0.0007 -0.0019 -0.0092 -0.0154 
 (0.266) (0.102) (0.832) (0.645) (0.276) (0.140) 
Fraction of independent directors 0.0328*** 0.0412*** 0.0031* 0.0044** 0.0285*** 0.0330*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.063) (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of executive-years 53311 28193 53311 28193 53311 28193 
Number of unique executives 18404 8222 18404 8222 18404 8222 
% Correctly Predicted 96.1 94.8 99.0 98.7 97.1 96.1 
Estimates are marginal effects; p-values in parentheses   
*** (**) (*) Marginal effect estimate is significant at 1% ; ** 5%; * 10% 
Dependent variables for the three departure outcomes are dummy variables that equal 1 if the executive departs, departs involuntarily, and departs voluntarily, respectively 
Each model contains a full set of year and industry dummies; industry categories include food and agriculture (the excluded group); entertainment and leisure; consumer 
and retail goods; health care services; textiles, construction and manufacturing; drugs and chemicals; mining and energy; utilities and telecommunications; electricity; and 
finance, insurance and real estate 
The excluded group of executive titles is vice-president 
Total direct compensation includes base salary, bonuses, and fringe benefits 
Total assets and return on assets are lagged one year prior to the year of observation listed for the executive 
Return on assets is measured as the deviation from the industry median, where industry groupings are as defined by Fama and French (1997) 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns are the deviations of actual monthly stock returns from the predictions of a market and industry model, summed over the year prior to that 
listed for the executive 
Executive equity ownership is calculated by multiplying the number of shares owned by the firm’s stock price per share at the end o f the year prior to that listed for the 
executive 
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Table 4 Random Effects Logit Models of the Reason for Departure (Separate Coefficient Estimates for Men and Women) 
Retirements included; regressions include interactions between female dummy and all control variables 
GENERAL DEPARTURE INVOLUNTARY DEPARTURE VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) 
Independent 
Variables 
COEFF. 
FOR MEN 
COEFF. 
FOR 
WOMEN 
COEFF. 
FOR MEN 
COEFF. 
FOR 
WOMEN 
COEFF. 
FOR MEN 
COEFF. 
FOR 
WOMEN 
COEFF. 
FOR MEN 
COEFF. 
FOR 
WOMEN 
COEFF. 
FOR MEN 
COEFF. 
FOR 
WOMEN 
COEFF. 
FOR MEN 
COEFF. 
FOR 
WOMEN 
Age X X 0.1937*** 0.2029 X X 0.3049*** 0.3768 X X 0.2711*** 0.0579 
   (0.000) (0.332)   (0.002) (0.291)   (0.000) (0.815) 
Age2 X X -0.0012*** -0.0020 X X -0.0029*** -0.0039 X X -0.0017*** -0.0005 
   (0.000) (0.365)   (0.002) (0.303)   (0.000) (0.863) 
Tenure X X -0.0067*** -0.0195* X X -0.0405*** -0.0343* X X -0.0007 -0.0068 
   (0.008) (0.094)   (0.000) (0.069)   (0.783) (0.623) 
Director 0.7805*** -0.0581 -0.0229 -0.8384** 0.2830** 0.6097 -0.0288 0.0628 0.9332*** -0.6834 -0.0209 -1.5189*** 
 (0.000) (0.859) (0.756) (0.012) (0.028) (0.158) (0.849) (0.887) (0.000) (0.156) (0.801) (0.002) 
CEO -0.8176*** -0.6636 -0.9571*** -0.7963 0.0171 -0.6510 -0.2434 -0.7603 -1.0563*** -0.5715 -1.1444*** -0.6969 
 (0.000) (0.240) (0.000) (0.159) (0.917) (0.377) (0.158) (0.302) (0.000) (0.504) (0.000) (0.414) 
CFO 0.1037 0.1019 -0.2022** -0.2154 0.2825** 0.1565 -0.3102 -0.1781 0.0425 0.0683 -0.1517 -0.1829 
 (0.134) (0.626) (0.033) (0.345) (0.036) (0.621) (0.125) (0.599) (0.593) (0.797) (0.153) (0.518) 
COO 0.1554** 0.3325 0.0524 0.0522 0.8119*** 0.1637 0.4370*** 0.0601 -0.1119 0.4401 -0.0925 0.0728 
 (0.048) (0.346) (0.570) (0.892) (0.000) (0.756) (0.007) (0.911) (0.241) (0.320) (0.402) (0.883) 
Log Compensation -0.0995*** 0.2915*** -0.1096*** 0.0933 0.0077 0.2085 -0.0027 -0.0396 -0.1384*** 0.3048** -0.1504*** 0.1640 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.408) (0.888) (0.144) (0.966) (0.810) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.247) 
Log Exec equity -0.0022*** -0.0164 -0.0031*** -0.0204 -0.0162*** -0.0170 -0.0130*** -0.0151 -0.0013* -0.0141 -0.0023*** -0.0257 
 (0.005) (0.243) (0.001) (0.232) (0.002) (0.367) (0.006) (0.446) (0.059) (0.485) (0.007) (0.361) 
Log Total Assets 0.1718*** -0.0448 0.1520*** -0.1138 0.1191*** 0.1279 0.1827*** 0.1432 0.1919*** -0.1735* 0.1487*** -0.2827*** 
 (0.000) (0.520) (0.000) (0.130) (0.007) (0.218) (0.001) (0.195) (0.000) (0.054) (0.000) (0.003) 
Adjusted ROA -0.9907*** -1.4834** -0.9815*** -0.9165 -1.2184*** -1.4204 -1.2227*** -0.6200 -0.7231*** -1.2523* -0.6384** -0.7880 
 (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.193) (0.000) (0.172) (0.001) (0.586) (0.002) (0.087) (0.031) (0.344) 
1-year BHAR -0.3845*** -0.7258*** -0.4278*** -0.6503*** -0.7337*** -0.5691** -0.8798*** -0.5500* -0.2329*** -0.7711*** -0.2321*** -0.6137** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.035) (0.000) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.010) 
Total directors -0.0386*** 0.0582 -0.0423*** 0.0811** -0.0979*** -0.0136 -0.0811*** -0.0005 -0.0187 0.1042** -0.0287** 0.1297*** 
 (0.000) (0.109) (0.001) (0.039) (0.000) (0.807) (0.002) (0.992) (0.116) (0.023) (0.045) (0.008) 
Pct. male directors -0.6953** 1.7065* -1.1268*** 1.0835 -0.6040 2.0050 -1.1071 1.6023 -0.6905* 1.3240 -1.0932** 0.6652 
 (0.028) (0.058) (0.004) (0.266) (0.310) (0.145) (0.138) (0.281) (0.061) (0.247) (0.016) (0.581) 
Pct. indep. directors 1.0282*** 0.6574 1.1833*** 0.5465 0.4307 1.0575 0.5975* 1.0564 1.2199*** 0.4383 1.3671*** 0.1767 
 (0.000) (0.174) (0.000) (0.293) (0.126) (0.158) (0.095) (0.180) (0.000) (0.470) (0.000) (0.782) 
Exec-years 53311 28193 53311 28193 53311 28193 
Executives 18404 8222 18404 8222 18404 8222 
% Correct Predict 96.1 94.8 99.0 98.7 97.1 96.1 
For each model, the first column lists the coefficient on the un-interacted form of each variable (i.e., the coefficient for men), and the second column lists the sums of the coefficients on the un-interacted and female-interacted forms of each variable (i.e., 
the coefficient for women). P-values in parentheses. *** (**) (*) Coefficient estimate is significant at 1% ; ** 5%; * 10% in a t-test for a single coefficient or a Chi-Square test for the sum of two coefficients 
Dependent variables for the three departure outcomes are dummy variables that equal 1 if the executive departs, departs involuntarily, and departs voluntarily, respectively 
If adjacent cells are shaded, it means the male and female coefficients are significantly different from each other at a maximum significance level of 10 percent (i.e., a significant coefficient on the interaction term) 
Each model contains a full set of year and industry dummies; industry categories include food and agriculture (the excluded group); entertainment and leisure; consumer and retail goods; health care services; textiles, construction and manufacturing; 
drugs and chemicals; mining and energy; utilities and telecommunications; electricity; and finance, insurance and real estate 
The excluded group of executive titles is vice-president; total compensation includes base salary, bonuses and fringe benefits; total assets and return on assets (ROA) are lagged one year prior to the year of observation listed for the executive 
Return on assets (ROA) is measured as the deviation from the industry median, where industry groupings are as defined by Fama and French (1997) 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are the deviations of actual monthly stock returns from the predictions of a market and industry model, summed over the year prior to that listed for the executive 
Executive equity ownership is the value of firm shares owned by the executive, which we calculate by multiplying the number of shares owned by the firm’s stock price per share at the end of the year prior to that listed for the executive 
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Table 5 P-Values for Differences between Male and Female Coefficients in Models with Gender Interactions 
Retirements included 
GENERAL  
DEPARTURE 
INVOLUNTARY  
DEPARTURE 
VOLUNTARY  DEPARTURE 
Independent 
Variables 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) 
Age X 0.965 X 0.846 X 0.396 
Age2 X 0.723 X 0.802 X 0.631 
Tenure X 0.282 X 0.758 X 0.666 
Director 0.012** 0.017** 0.468 0.845 0.001*** 0.002*** 
CEO 0.787 0.779 0.376 0.494 0.573 0.602 
CFO 0.993 0.957 0.714 0.738 0.926 0.918 
COO 0.624 1.000 0.234 0.504 0.223 0.744 
Log Compensation 0.000*** 0.082* 0.183 0.833 0.000*** 0.031** 
Log Exec equity 0.311 0.312 0.965 0.918 0.526 0.406 
Log Total Assets 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.936 0.740 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Adjusted ROA 0.443 0.930 0.851 0.613 0.490 0.865 
1-year BHAR 0.067* 0.277 0.569 0.300 0.022** 0.129 
Total directors 0.010** 0.003*** 0.154 0.209 0.009*** 0.002*** 
Pct. male directors 0.011** 0.032** 0.076* 0.094* 0.090* 0.164 
Pct. indep. directors 0.462 0.247 0.431 0.594 0.214 0.077** 
Exec-years 53311 28193 53311 28193 53311 28193 
Executives 18404 8222 18404 8222 18404 8222 
*** (**) (*) Coefficient estimate is significant at 1% ; ** 5%; * 10% , respectively 
Dependent variables for the three departure outcomes are dummy variables that equal 1 if the executive departs, departs involuntarily, and departs voluntarily, 
respectively 
Each model contains a full set of year and industry dummies. Industry categories include food and agriculture (the excluded group); entertainment and leisure; 
consumer and retail goods; health care services; textiles, construction, and manufacturing; drugs and chemicals; mining and energy; utilities and 
telecommunications; electricity; and finance, insurance, and real estate 
The excluded group of executive titles is vice-president 
Total direct compensation includes base salary, bonuses, and fringe benefits 
Total assets and return on assets are lagged one year prior to the year of observation listed for the executive 
Return on assets (ROA) is measured as the deviation from the industry median, where industry groupings are as defined by Fama and French (1997) 
Buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are the deviations of actual monthly stock returns from the predictions of a market and industry model, summed over the 
year prior to that listed for the executive 
Executive equity ownership is calculated by multiplying the number of shares owned by the firm’s stock price per share at the end of the year prior to that listed for 
the executive 
 
 
 
